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Shifting From the Inquisitorial to the Adversarial 
Model in Criminal Cases: Is a Hearsay Rule 
Indispensable? 
Miguel A. Méndez* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In January 2008, my colleagues, Lucy Tacher and José Antonio Cabal-
lero, apprised me of the reform Mexico is undertaking in how criminal cas-
es are tried.  Among the jurisdictions that follow the civil law tradition, 
Mexico has hewed closely to the inquisitorial model.  The movement to 
switch to an adversarial model began in some Mexican states but soon 
spread to the federal government.  By the spring, the federal Congress had 
approved a constitutional amendment that incorporates many features of the 
adversarial system into Mexican criminal trial practice.  After a majority of 
the state legislatures also approved the amendment, Congress’s Permanent 
Committee on June 18, 2008 officially published the newly adopted 
amendment.1  New Article 20 provides that “criminal proceedings shall be 
accusatory and oral.  They shall be governed by the principles of open pro-
ceedings, confrontation, concentration, continuity, and immediacy.”2  
 Comparativists use the concepts of orality, immediacy, and concen-
tration to contrast the common law with the civil law system.3  Orality re-
fers to the preference for testimony as opposed to depositions, affidavits, 
and written declarations of witnesses. 4  Immediacy relates to the absence of 
                                                                                                                           
  
*  Martin Luther King, Jr. Hall Research Scholar and Professor of Law, U.C. Davis School of 
Law. Adelbert H. Sweet Professor of Law, Emeritus, Stanford University.  A Spanish version of this 
article was published in the summer of 2009 in ITER CRIMINIS, a publication of the Instituto Nacional 
de Ciencias Penales (National Institute of Criminal Studies), a major research center established by the 
government of Mexico in 1976.  See La Prueba de Referencia y el Derecho del Acusado a Repreguntar 
a Testigos Adversos en los Estados Unidos de América, 8 ITER CRIMINIS 11 — REVISTA DE CIENCIAS 
PENALES, INSTITUTO NACIONAL DE CIENCIAS PENALES (Marzo - Abril 2009). 
 I am indebted to Professor Manuel Gómez for his invaluable assistance in ensuring that this ar-
ticle can be understood by legal scholars and policy makers who are not trained in the common law 
adversarial trial system. 
 
1
  See http://natlaw.com/interam/mx/any/pr/prmxany00064.htm. (last visited 2009). 
 
2
 Id. 
 
3
 See, e.g., JOHN H. MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL 
SYSTEMS OF WESTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 120-25 (1969).  
 
4
 Id. at 123. 
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intermediaries between the evidentiary sources, especially witnesses, and 
the fact finders.5  Concentration is associated with the preference for a sin-
gle hearing to receive the evidence.6  
In contrast to some civil law models, the American trial is a model of 
orality, immediacy, and concentration.  Proof consists mainly of the testi-
mony of witnesses.  The parties, through their lawyers, and not the presid-
ing judge, have the principal responsibility for interrogating witnesses in 
the presence of the fact finders.  And although American trials can consume 
many days or weeks, they are nonetheless conceived as consisting of a sin-
gle event as opposed to stages.  Article 20’s express reference to these con-
cepts underscores the Mexican commitment to switch to the adversarial 
system, especially as that system is understood in the United States. 
Ms. Tacher is the Executive Director of the Rule of Law Program in 
Mexico.7  Among the program’s goals are protecting the fundamental rights 
of Mexicans by creating an accusatory system of justice.8  Professor Cabal-
lero is an associate at the Juridical Studies Division of the Economics and 
Teaching Research Center.9  “The division seeks to promote a system of 
credible and efficacious legal rules by encouraging new methods for study-
ing and teaching law in Mexico.”10 
Ms. Tacher and Professor Caballero contacted me because at Stanford 
Law School I specialize in evidence and trial advocacy.  They provided me 
with the reform legislation approved by one of the Mexican states.  An as-
pect that attracted my attention was the absence of a hearsay rule.  Because 
in the United States the hearsay rule is inseparable from the right given a 
party to cross-examine the opposing party’s witnesses, I thought that it 
might be useful to provide Mexican scholars and policy makers with an 
overview of the important role the hearsay rule plays in American evidence 
law and criminal trials.  
Although as amended Article 20 generally requires evidence to be tak-
en in open court subject to cross-examination, the reformed article does not 
explicitly bar the use of hearsay.11  That omission, however, does not pre-
vent the state legislatures or the federal Congress from enacting legislation 
                                                                                                                           
 
5
 See MAURO CAPPELLETTI, JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE ITALIAN 
LEGAL SYSTEM § 4.15, at 137 (1967).  
 
6
 Id. 
 
7
 Directora General del Programa de Apoyo para el Estado de Derecho en México 
(PRODERECHO).   
 
8
 See http://www.proderecho.com/pagina.php?id_pagina=227. 
 
9
 Socio en la División de Estudios Jurídicos del Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas 
(CIDE).  
 
10
 See http://www.cide.mx/div_estudios_juridicos.htm. (last visited 2009).   
 
11
 See Artículo 20 A I – VI en  http://natlaw.com/interam/mx/any/pr/prmxany00064.htm.   
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barring the use of hearsay.  A transitional article provides the federal Con-
gress and the state legislatures a period of eight years to enact the legisla-
tion necessary to implement an accusatory system in criminal proceedings.12 
II.  AMERICAN FEDERALISM AND PROCEDURAL RULES 
In the United States, each state has the power under the Federal Con-
stitution to enact its own rules of criminal procedure and evidence.  Al-
though the federal courts have their own rules of criminal procedure and 
evidence, nothing in the Federal Constitution obligates the states to adopt 
identical or even similar rules.  The latitude afforded states, however, has 
not led to procedural systems that are widely at variance with each other.  In 
the fields of criminal procedure and evidence, there is some uniformity.  
Much of it can be traced to the origins of American criminal law.  Even 
today, many “modern” procedural rules are but derivatives of principles 
first laid down centuries ago by the English common law judges.  The criti-
cal stages—arraignment and trial—were widely used by the English judges.  
The principal purpose of the arraignment is to put the accused on notice of 
the charges brought against him.  In the event he pleads not guilty, the trial 
affords him an opportunity to be heard before being adjudged guilty.  
The founders of the Federal Constitution used these basic principles to 
define the rights of the accused in federal criminal trials.13  Beginning in the 
mid-1960s, the United States Supreme Court began to apply to state crimi-
nal proceedings some of the procedural safeguards which the Bill of Rights 
guarantees to the accused in federal criminal trials.  Chief among these 
guarantees are the right to counsel,14 to trial by jury in non-petty cases,15 to 
confront the state’s witnesses,16 to produce evidence refuting the charges,17 
to avoid self-incrimination,18 and to an acquittal unless proven guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt.19  
Similarity in state and federal evidentiary rules can also be attributed 
to the English common law.  Today’s evidence codes can be traced to evi-
dentiary concepts first introduced by the English common law judges, and 
                                                                                                                           
 
12
 Id. 
 
13
 See U.S. CONST., amend. V-VI. 
 
14
 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to trial counsel); Douglas v. California, 372 
U.S. 353 (1963) (right to appellate counsel). 
 
15
 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). 
 
16
 Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965). 
 
17
 Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973). 
 
18
 Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). 
 
19
 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). 
16 FIU Law Review [5:13 
 
then developed further by American judges.20  One focus of this article – the 
hearsay rule – was first developed and applied by the English judges.  In the 
United States, the most influential event in the development of the rules of 
evidence occurred when some states and then the federal government codi-
fied the rules that apply in their respective tribunals.21  Codification is a 
relatively recent phenomenon.  The California Legislature, for example, did 
not enact the Evidence Code until 1965 and Congress did not enact the 
Federal Rules of Evidence until 1975.  Today, most states have modeled 
their rules on the Federal Rules of Evidence,22 a factor which helps explain 
further the similarity among the various evidence codes that exist in the 
United States. 
III.  CONFRONTATION AND CROSS-EXAMINATION 
The right of American criminal defendants to cross examine the wit-
nesses called by the state can be traced to the Bill of Rights.  The Sixth 
Amendment provides that in “all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him . . . .”23  
Initially, this right applied only in federal criminal trials, as the intent of the 
framers was to garner public support for the Constitution by adopting a 
number of amendments (the Bill of Rights) designed to limit federal pow-
er.
24
  Although most state constitutions or criminal procedure codes guaran-
tee a similar confrontation right to state criminal defendants, until 1965 
states were free to dispense with this right.  That latitude, however, ended 
that year when the United States Supreme Court held in Pointer v. Texas25 
that the Sixth Amendment’s right of confrontation applies to state criminal 
trials as well.26  The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment pro-
vides that no state may “deprive any person of life, liberty or property, 
without due process of law . . . .”27  Because in the Court’s view, the right to 
                                                                                                                           
 
20
 See CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 244 (3d ed. West 1984) (discuss-
ing especially the English origin of the hearsay rule). 
 
21
 See MIGUEL MÉNDEZ, EVIDENCE: THE CALIFORNIA CODE AND THE FEDERAL RULES—A 
PROBLEM APPROACH (4th ed. Thomson-West 2008). 
 
22
 “As of January 2007, forty-two states and Puerto Rico had adopted the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence in various forms.” JACK B. WEINSTEIN, JOHN H. MANSFIELD, NORMAN. ABRAMS & MARGARET 
A. BERGER, EVIDENCE: 2007 RULES, STATUTE AND CASE SUPPLEMENT iii (Foundation Press 2007). 
 
23
 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 
24
 It was not until the mid-1960s that the United States Supreme Court took up the question 
whether the procedural rights the Fourth and Fifth Amendments guarantee to federal criminal defendants 
also apply to state criminal defendants by virtue of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. See the cases cited in notes 14 – 19 supra.   
 
25
 Pointer, 380 U.S. 400 (1965). 
 
26
 Id. at 403. 
 
27
 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
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confront witnesses is essential to a fair trial, the Court relied on the Due 
Process Clause to hold that state criminal defendants are also entitled to 
confront the state’s witnesses.28  
In the United States, understanding the importance of the Confronta-
tion Clause in criminal trials requires appreciating the role of the jurors.  
Their role is to reconstruct a historical event from the evidence presented by 
the parties.  Jurors are called upon to participate in the trial because the 
parties disagree about what happened.  The purpose of the trial is to afford 
each side an opportunity to persuade the jurors to accept its version of what 
occurred.  The jurors’ reconstruction of what happened will determine 
whether the accused will be held accountable or exonerated.29  
Three aspects about American jury trials are especially pertinent in 
understanding the role of the jurors.  First, how a trial unfolds depends on 
the initiative of the parties.  It is the parties who will decide which wit-
nesses to call, the order in which to call them, the questions which the wit-
nesses will be asked to answer, and which non-testimonial evidence will be 
offered.30  The second aspect is related to the adversarial nature of jury tri-
als.  Because how trials unfold depends on the initiative of the parties, each 
side can be depended upon to produce the most helpful information availa-
ble to reconstruct its version of the past event.31 
Finally, the rules of evidence play a crucial part in shaping what par-
ties can and cannot do.  The rules place limits or an outright ban on the in-
formation the parties may seek to place before the jurors.  The rules, for 
example, ban irrelevant evidence, exclude some relevant evidence in order 
to promote other policies (e.g., protect privileged information), ban evi-
dence the legislature deems unduly prejudicial (e.g., character evidence), 
and place limits on what parties can do to support the credibility of their 
witnesses and to attack the credibility of their opponents’ witnesses.  The 
rules also restrict the use of evidence the legislature considers unreliable. 
Hearsay is the classic example. 
While the rules do seek to exclude unreliable evidence, they cannot 
guarantee that all evidence presented to the jurors will be reliable.  Wit-
nesses sometimes lie; at other times, they may be mistaken.  What the rules 
can and should do is give the parties an opportunity to present the jurors 
with reasons why they should reject the other side’s evidence.  In the case 
                                                                                                                           
 
28
 Pointer, 380 U.S. at 403. 
 
29
 See MÉNDEZ, supra note 21, at § 15.01. 
 
30
 See id.. at §§ 1.01-1.02. 
 
31
 Id. 
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of testimony, the parties are given a powerful tool: the right to cross-
examine adverse witnesses under oath in the presence of the jurors.32 
An American jury trial, then, is predicated on the assumption that ju-
rors are most likely to reconstruct a past event accurately if the parties are 
given an opportunity to demonstrate why they should give little or no 
weight to the evidence presented by the opposing party.  Since cross-
examination of witnesses is essential in exposing flaws in the testimony 
given on direct examination, confidence in the accuracy of a jury verdict is 
necessarily undermined whenever a party is deprived of the opportunity to 
cross examine the adversary’s witnesses under oath in the presence of the 
jurors.  This goal, however, cannot be achieved if hearsay is freely admissi-
ble under the rules of evidence. 
IV.  CROSS-EXAMINATION AND THE HEARSAY RULE 
Assume that a defendant is prosecuted for reckless driving on the 
theory that he injured the victim, another driver, when he ran a red light and 
struck her car.  The victim testifies that, as she entered the intersection, the 
traffic light facing her was green and that moments later the defendant’s car 
struck her on the driver’s side.  In its case-in-chief, the State calls a motorist 
who testifies that he and his spouse were parked at the intersection and that 
after the collision, his spouse said to him that the light facing the defendant 
was red. 
Under American procedural rules, the victim’s testimony alone would 
make out a prima facie case and allow the state to get to the jury on the 
issue of whether the defendant committed the offense.  With the motorist’s 
testimony, the State’s chances of persuading the jury to return a guilty ver-
dict are enhanced significantly.  But if the defendant contradicts the victim’s 
testimony (e.g. “I had the green light”) and precludes the motorist from 
testifying, the outcome is cast into doubt.  Indeed, if under these circums-
tances the jurors cannot decide whether to believe the victim or the defen-
dant, they would have to acquit the defendant since the State has the burden 
of proving each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.33  To the 
defendant, then, preventing the motorist from testifying is crucial. 
Over a hearsay objection, should the motorist be allowed to testify that 
his spouse told him that the light facing the defendant was red?  In the 
United States, the answer is “no” if the state is offering the motorist’s testi-
mony to establish the color of the light facing the defendant.  In the words 
                                                                                                                           
 
32
 See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 711 (West 1995). 
 
33
 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). 
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of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the motorist’s testimony would be hear-
say because it consists of:  
[A] statement, other than made by the declarant while testifying at the 
trial or hearing [what the spouse told the motorist about the color of 
the light], offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted 
[that the color of the light facing the defendant was red at the time of 
the collision].34 
Why should the hearsay rule disfavor the use of the spouse’s state-
ment?  One reason is that receiving hearsay through a witness other than the 
declarant deprives the party opposing the hearsay from cross examining the 
declarant.  Cross examiners generally have one of two goals: (1) to per-
suade a witness to recant the testimony given on direct examination and, 
instead, affirm the cross examiner’s theory of the case or (2) failing that, to 
discredit the witness’s account on direct examination by impeaching the 
witness’s credibility. 
An example of the former would be a concession by the spouse on 
cross-examination that, indeed, the color of the light facing the defendant 
was really green.  That does not happen often.  More likely, she might con-
cede that, although she thinks the light was red, she cannot be absolutely 
sure because the sun was in her eyes.  But regardless of which goal the 
cross examiner pursues, one matter is clear: the cross examiner cannot pur-
sue either goal unless the motorist’s spouse is produced for cross-
examination under oath in the presence of the jurors.  What matters to the 
cross-examiner is her ability to perceive and recall the color of the light 
accurately, as well as her willingness to tell the truth about what she saw. 
The motorist’s abilities in these respects are much less important, since he 
did not see the light.  Put another way, even if the motorist correctly heard 
what his spouse said about the color of the light and even if he recalls her 
statement correctly and relates it accurately to the jury, none of that would 
matter if his spouse either lied or was mistaken about the color of the light.  
The hearsay rule thus forces parties to focus on evidence about what people 
saw and heard, and not about what they heard others say they saw or 
heard.35 
Some American authorities link the hearsay rule to goals that go 
beyond the concessions that might be obtained on cross-examination.  In 
                                                                                                                           
 
34
 FED. R. EVID. 801(c). 
 
35
 One, of course, can acquire information through senses other than sight or sound.  One can also 
perceive by touching, smelling, and tasting.  The California Evidence Code, for example, recognizes 
that all five senses are involved in the acquisition of knowledge.  See CAL. EVID. CODE § 170 (West 
1995). 
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their view, the use of hearsay violates the ideal conditions under which tes-
timony should be received: witnesses should testify under oath in the fact 
finder’s presence and subject to cross-examination.36  The oath is believed 
to impress witnesses with the importance of testifying truthfully.37  Having 
witnesses testify before the fact finders (whether judges or jurors) enables 
them to take the witnesses’ demeanor into account in assessing their credi-
bility.38  And subjecting witnesses to a searching cross-examination helps 
the opposing party expose inadvertent as well as conscious inaccuracies in 
perception, recollection, and narration (including lack of sincerity).39 
Sometimes hearsay is described as inherently untrustworthy.  What is 
meant is that hearsay should not be relied upon in reaching factual decisions 
in the absence of the kind of cross-examination that has been described.  
The hearsay rule, however, does not proceed on the assumption that the 
hearsay declaration (in our example, what the spouse told the motorist) 
should be received in evidence so long as the opposing party is given a 
chance to call and cross-examine the hearsay declarant (the spouse); on the 
contrary, the rule makes the declaration inadmissible.  If the State wants to 
establish the color of the light facing the motorist’s spouse at the time of the 
collision, then, in the absence of hearsay exceptions, the State must do so 
by offering the spouse as a witness on that point and not by offering the 
spouse’s statement to her husband or to anyone else. 
This insight has serious implications in American criminal trials.  
From an instrumental perspective, it means that the accused should always 
be accorded an opportunity to cross examine his or her accusers under oath 
in the presence of the jurors.  That, however, may not always be possible.  
For example, the person accusing the defendant might be dead, and unless 
his statement identifying the accused as his killer is admitted at the trial, the 
accused might go free.  Framers of the rules of evidence, whether legisla-
tors or judges, have struggled with this and similar problems, and arrived at 
different compromises reflected in the various exceptions to the hearsay 
rule.  But until 1965, state legislators and judges, in whose courts most 
criminal trials take place, were free to consider the question of exceptions 
without taking into account federal constitutional constraints. 
That freedom ended with the United States Supreme Court’s Pointer 
decision.  Since that time, the Court has tried to define the circumstances 
when out of court statements can be offered by the prosecution against the 
accused without having to accord the accused an opportunity to cross ex-
                                                                                                                           
 
36
 See FED. R. EVID. ART. VIII advisory committee’s note. 
 
37
 Id. 
 
38
 Id. 
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 Id. 
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amine the declarant.  Initially, the Court evolved a two part test: (1) if the 
statement offered against the defendant fell within a “firmly rooted” excep-
tion to the hearsay rule, cross-examination could be done away with;40 (2) 
but if the statement did not fall into such an exception, then cross-
examination could be dispensed with only if the prosecution convinced the 
judge that the circumstances attending the making of the statement indi-
cated that it was reliable.41 
In Crawford v. Washington,42 the Court abandoned the two part test 
when the statement offered against the defendant qualified as a “testimoni-
al” hearsay.43  When it does, then the prosecution must produce the decla-
rant for cross-examination at the trial unless one of two exceptions apply: 
(1) either the accused was given an opportunity prior to the trial to cross 
examine the declarant44 or (2) the accused has forfeited his right to object 
on Sixth Amendment grounds by engaging in wrongdoing that prevented 
the declarant from testifying.45   
Testimony from a preliminary hearing can illustrate how the Crawford 
requirements can be satisfied.  In many American states, a defendant may 
not be tried for committing a serious criminal offense (usually one punisha-
ble in state prison by more than a year), unless at a hearing prior to the trial 
(a preliminary hearing) the State convinces the judge on the basis of the 
evidence presented that there is probable cause to believe that a serious 
crime was committed and that the defendant is the person who committed 
the offense.46  Assume a case in which the defendant is charged with assault. 
At the preliminary hearing, the State calls the victim who testifies under 
oath that the defendant attacked her without justification.  The defendant is 
then given an opportunity to cross-examine the victim.  After evaluating all 
of the evidence, the judge determines that the defendant should be tried on 
the charge of assault.  If for some reason the victim is unavailable to testify 
at the trial, under the rules of evidence of all states, the prosecution may 
read to the jurors the testimony the victim gave at the preliminary hearing 
on direct examination.47  The testimony (“the defendant attacked me with-
out provocation”) is unquestionably hearsay; the State is offering it to prove 
as true the propositions the victim asserted in her statement (that she was 
                                                                                                                           
 
40
 See Roberts v. Ohio, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).  
 
41
 See Idaho v. Wright, 110 U.S. 3139, 3147 (1990). 
 
42
 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 
43
 Id. at 40. 
 
44
 Id. 
 
45
 See Giles v. California, 128 S.Ct. 2678, 2688 (2008). 
 
46
 See e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 871 and 872(a) (West 2008).  
 
47
 The defendant would be entitled to read to the jury the testimony which the victim gave on the 
defendant’s cross-examination. 
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attacked without justification and that the defendant was the one who at-
tacked her).  Nonetheless, the judge would have to overrule the defendant’s 
hearsay exception.  All states have enacted an exception for “prior testimo-
ny.”  Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(1) is illustrative.  It creates an excep-
tion for testimony,  
given as a witness at another hearing of the same or different proceed-
ing, or in a deposition taken in compliance with law in the course of 
the same or different proceeding, if the party against whom the testi-
mony is now offered, or, in a civil action or proceeding, a predecessor 
in interest, had an opportunity and similar motive to develop the tes-
timony by direct, cross, or redirect examination.48  
Our example meets the requirements of the exception: the accused was 
given an opportunity at the preliminary hearing to cross-examine the wit-
ness with an interest and motive similar to the ones he would have at the 
trial. 
The defendant, of course, is still free to object to the introduction of 
the victim’s testimony on Sixth Amendment grounds.  Although the United 
States Supreme Court has yet to provide a comprehensive definition of “tes-
timonial hearsay,” the Court has held that the term includes testimony given 
at a prior trial, before a grand jury, or at a preliminary hearing.49  Since in 
our hypothetical the defendant was given an opportunity to cross-examine 
the victim under oath at the preliminary hearing, the judge would have to 
overrule the defendant’s Sixth Amendment objection.  
Most hearsay exceptions do not require proof that the opponent was 
given an opportunity to cross examine the declarant at a prior hearing.  An 
example is California’s exception for statements by declarants describing 
the infliction or threat of physical injury upon the declarant.50  In People v. 
Giles,51 the defendant was prosecuted for murder.  To prove that the defen-
dant was the murderer, the prosecution offered a declaration by the victim 
in which she told a police officer that the defendant had threatened to kill 
her.  Although the victim’s statement was hearsay, the trial judge overruled 
the defendant’s hearsay objection because the statement fell within the Cali-
fornia exception for statements relating to the threat of infliction of physical 
injury upon the declarant.  The defendant also objected on Sixth Amend-
ment grounds.  Although the California Supreme Court agreed that the 
statement constituted “testimonial” hearsay under Crawford, the court 
                                                                                                                           
 
48
 FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1). 
 
49
 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56 (2004). 
 
50
 See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1370 (West 1995). 
 
51
 People v. Giles, 152 P.3d 433 (Cal. 2007). 
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nonetheless upheld the trial judge’s admission of the statement.  As the 
court explained, under another United States Supreme Court decision, Da-
vis v. Washington, the defendant had forfeited his right to object on Sixth 
Amendment grounds.52  By killing the victim, the defendant had engaged in 
wrongdoing that prevented her from testifying at the trial.53   
The two examples illustrate important aspects about a criminal defen-
dant’s right to cross examine his accusers in American trials.  First, al-
though the hearsay rule favors the defendant by excluding statements by 
witnesses who cannot be cross examined, the reach of the rule is limited by 
exceptions to the rule.  Second, not all hearsay offered by the prosecution 
under the exceptions results in a confrontation violation.  Only hearsay that 
qualifies as “testimonial” can result in a violation.  Third, even the prosecu-
tion’s use of testimonial hearsay will not result in a Sixth Amendment viola-
tion if the defendant has been accorded an opportunity prior to the trial to 
cross examine the hearsay declarant.  Finally, even if the defendant was not 
accorded such an opportunity, no Sixth Amendment violation will occur if 
the defendant has forfeited his right to object on confrontation grounds. 
All four qualifications have resulted in still unresolved complications 
in Sixth Amendment jurisprudence.  The United States Supreme Court’s 
refusal to define “testimonial” hearsay comprehensively has created grave 
uncertainties about what constitutes “testimonial” hearsay.  Until recently, 
for example, state and lower federal courts, for example, were divided on 
whether Crawford applies to statements in reports prepared by government 
chemists in which they identify as controlled substances (e.g., heroin) the 
substance taken from the defendant.54  The Court, moreover, has not defined 
what counts as a prior opportunity to cross examine the hearsay declarant.  
Presumably, the defendant must have been accorded an opportunity to cross 
examine the declarant with an interest and motive similar to those the de-
fendant has at the trial.  In addition, the Court has not specified all of the 
elements of the forfeiture doctrine.  Although the Court requires the State to 
prove that the defendant engaged in wrongdoing for the purpose of prevent-
ing the declarant from testifying,55 the Court had not yet ruled on the stan-
dard of persuasion which the State must meet or whether in making out a 
                                                                                                                           
 
52
 Davis v. Washington, 557 U.S. 813, 827 (2006).  
 
53
 People v. Giles, 152 P.3d at 447.  This aspect was reversed by the United States Supreme Court 
in Giles v. California, 128 S.Ct. 2678 (2008), where the Court held that forfeiture requires the prosecu-
tion to prove that the defendant engaged in wrongdoing designed to prevent the declarant from testify-
ing.  Id. at 2688. 
 
54
 See MÉNDEZ, supra note 21, § 607.  In June 2009, the United States Supreme Court ended the 
controversy by holding that in most instances the prosecution’s use of such reports constitutes testimoni-
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forfeiture case the State may rely on the hearsay statement at issue.  Of 
greater interest to readers unfamiliar with American rules of proof is the 
question of hearsay exceptions.  If hearsay should be excluded because it is 
inherently unreliable, then how can American jurisdictions justify the nu-
merous exceptions found in their codes? 
V.  EXCEPTIONS TO THE HEARSAY RULE  
When I was a law student in the late 1960s, I recall studying less than 
fifteen exceptions to the hearsay rule.  Today, the Federal Rules of Evidence 
contain almost forty exceptions and “exemptions.”56  Given the explosion in 
exceptions, one cannot help but wonder whether the hearsay rule retains 
much bite.  In theory, all of the exceptions are available to the prosecution. 
In practice, however, prosecutors usually resort to a smaller number of ex-
ceptions.  California, which tries more criminal cases than any other Ameri-
can jurisdictions, is an example.  
Occasionally, California prosecutors find it indispensable as well as 
useful to offer the statements of declarants who for some reason are unable 
to testify at the trial.  Since these statements are often offered for the truth 
of the matter stated, California’s hearsay rule would bar their use in the 
absence of an exception.57  Fortunately for prosecutors, the Evidence Code 
contains numerous useful exceptions.  Among these are the exceptions for 
excited utterances,58 dying declarations,59 declarations against interest,60 co-
conspirators’ declarations,61 statements of prior identification,62 declarations 
regarding states of mind,63 entries in business or official records,64 prior 
testimony,65 statements regarding gang related crimes,66 statements relating 
to the infliction or threat of physical injury,67 statements by the elderly or 
dependent adults offered in prosecutions for the crime of elderly or depen-
dent adult abuse,68 statements by children describing acts of child abuse,69 
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and statements by declarants who are prevented from testifying in trials 
charging a serious felony.70 
With the exception of excited utterances, co-conspirators’ declarations, 
entries in business or official records, mental state declarations, and dying 
declarations, the remaining exceptions require prosecutors to prove the dec-
larant’s unavailability to testify at the trial.  If the declarant is available to 
testify, no justification is believed to exist for depriving defendants of their 
right to cross examine the declarant under oath in the presence of the fact 
finder.  
All of the exceptions contain other restrictions.  Some limit the excep-
tion to certain kinds of prosecutions, for example, prosecutions charging a 
serious felony,71 elderly or dependent adult abuse,72 or gang activities.73  
Some require the statement to be memorialized in a writing or recorded 
electronically.74  Others require the prosecution to give the defendant notice 
of its intention to offer the statement.75  Still others provide the judge with 
guidelines for determining the admissibility of the statement.76  Some re-
quire the statement to be supported by corroborative evidence.77  Others 
merely require the judge to consider the presence or absence of supporting 
evidence in determining the admissibility of the statement.78  The exception 
for statements offered in cases charging a serious felony is specifically de-
signed to make admissible statements by declarants who have been pre-
vented from testifying.79 
Little would be gained by explaining the requirements of each of these 
exceptions in detail.  This information is readily available in a treatise.80  
More useful to readers unfamiliar with American evidence law is how the 
exceptions developed and the grounds advanced for their justification.  
As has been noted, the codification of the rules of evidence in the 
United States is a recent phenomenon.  Most codes were enacted in the last 
third of the Twentieth Century.  Prior to that time, the hearsay rule and its 
exceptions were the creations of appellate judges using their common law 
power to fashion legal rules.  Because the rules were created for a specific 
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case on appeal, the judges did not have the occasion to consider the broad 
question of what circumstances justified exceptions generally.  Instead, the 
judges were confronted with the narrow question of whether the circums-
tances attending the making of a particular declaration offered at the trial 
justified an exception.  Not surprisingly, it is hard in retrospect to discern all 
the concerns that prompted the judges to create the exceptions.  At least 
two, however, appear to have motivated the judges.  One was the need for 
the hearsay.  The other was the belief that the circumstances attending the 
statement suggested that it was so reliable as to dispense with the need for 
the adverse party to cross examine the hearsay declarant. 
Three early exceptions illustrate this approach – the exceptions for dy-
ing declarations, declarations against interest, and excited utterances.  All 
American jurisdictions recognize the exception for dying declarations.  
These consist of statements made by a declarant, while believing that his or 
her death is imminent, concerning the cause or circumstances of what the 
declarant believes to be impending death.81  An example would be the 
statement, “Help me!  I am dying.  Joe Blow just stabbed me.”  Without the 
exception, the statement would be inadmissible under the hearsay rule to 
prove that Joe Blow stabbed the victim.  If the victim in fact dies, a prose-
cutor would not be inclined to prosecute Joe Blow if the statement is the 
key evidence linking Joe Blow with the homicide.  Thus the need for this 
kind of evidence probably accounts in part for the exception.  In addition, 
most exceptions include requirements designed to assure the reliability of 
the declaration.  In the case of dying declarations, the common law judges 
insisted on proof that the declarant believed himself about to die.  They 
were willing to accept the cultural assumption that people about to die will 
not lie, as they do not want to meet their Creator with a falsehood on their 
lips.82  If the declarant was not religious, then they were disposed to accept 
the assumption that individuals facing the prospect of immediate death have 
no motive to lie.83 
American jurisdictions also recognize an exception for declarations 
against interest.  In any trial in which liability is contested, nothing helps 
defendants more than the testimony of a witness who admits responsibility 
for the wrong at issue.  If the witness cannot be called because he is un-
available, the next best thing is for defendants to offer an out of court 
statement in which the witness admits responsibility.  The California Evi-
dence Code, for example, creates a hearsay exception for such statements.84 
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To be admissible, the proponent must persuade the judge that the declarant 
is unavailable to testify and that it was against the declarant's interest to 
have made the declaration.85  As in the case of dying declarations, need jus-
tifies the exception.  A party may not invoke the exception if the declarant 
is available to testify.  Declarations against interest are considered reliable.  
The rules of evidence assume that people do not say things disserving of 
their interests unless they believe their statements to be true.  However, this 
commonplace assumption has not been tested empirically. 
In contrast, the justification for excited utterances does not rest on 
need, only on reliability.  American jurisdictions provide a hearsay excep-
tion for a “statement relating a startling event or condition made while the 
declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condi-
tion.”86  Under this exception, the prosecution would be entitled to offer a 
declaration by a witness who was overheard saying, “Look, Joe Blow is 
stabbing the victim,” as proof that the defendant, Joe Blow, stabbed the 
victim.  Because the exception does not require the prosecution to prove the 
witness’s unavailability to testify, the declaration may be offered by the 
witness as well as by anyone who heard the witness make the statement.  
Why are excited utterances considered so reliable as to dispense with the 
need to cross-examine the declarant?  Because of the belief that the spon-
taneity associated with such statements deprives the declarant of an oppor-
tunity for reflection and deliberate fabrication.87 
The Federal Rules of Evidence classify the hearsay exceptions into 
two categories.  One requires the proponent of the hearsay to prove the un-
availability of the hearsay declarant to testify as a condition of admissibili-
ty.  The other lists those hearsay exceptions where the unavailability of the 
hearsay declarant to testify is immaterial to admissibility.  Twenty-three 
exceptions are listed under this category88 while only five are listed under 
the former.89  These results are surprising.  Given the important role of 
cross-examination in exposing flaws in testimony, one would have expected 
the opposite results.  
Imagine a convention of scholars convening for the first time to con-
sider the creation of a hearsay rule.  Given the crucial role of cross-
examination, the scholars contemplating exceptions to the hearsay rule 
might begin their discussion by noting that hearsay should not be admissi-
ble unless the proponent first establishes the declarant’s unavailability to 
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testify.  If the declarant is available to testify, there is no need to strip the 
opponent of the right to cross examine the declarant.  The convention might 
then formulate a forfeiture doctrine.  Parties, for example, might forfeit 
their right to object on hearsay grounds when the offering party can per-
suade the judge that the objecting party engaged in wrongdoing that was 
designed to prevent or dissuade the declarant from testifying.90  Parties who 
seek to undermine the judicial process by procuring or coercing silence 
from witnesses should not be allowed to profit from their wrongdoing.91  
Then the convention could get down to the difficult business of determining 
when the circumstances attending the making of some out of court state-
ments render the statements so reliable as a class to justify dispensing with 
the need to cross examine the declarant.  These questions confronted Amer-
ican scholars when the United States Supreme Court convened a committee 
to draft the Federal Rules of Evidence. 
VI.  CHOICES FACING POLICY MAKERS  
One of the most recent American studies of hearsay was conducted by 
the Advisory Committee appointed by the United States Supreme Court in 
1965 to draft rules of evidence for the federal courts.  In its study, the Advi-
sory Committee acknowledged the central role the hearsay rule plays in 
preserving a party’s right to cross examine the witnesses called by the ad-
verse party.92  The surest way to preserve this right is simply by excluding 
all hearsay.  But as the Advisory Committee conceded: 
No one advocates this position. Common sense tells that much evi-
dence which is not given under the three [ideal] conditions [that is, 
under oath and subject to cross-examination in the presence of the fact 
finder] may be inherently superior to much that is.  Moreover, when 
the choice is between evidence which is less than best and no evidence 
at all, only clear folly would dictate an across-the-board policy of 
doing without.  The problem thus resolves itself into effecting a sensi-
ble accommodation between these considerations and the desirability 
of giving testimony under the ideal conditions.93 
If the choice is between excluding all hearsay or admitting some evi-
dence “which is less than best,” a rule favoring some evidence rather than 
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none would call for the abolition of the hearsay rule.  But as the Advisory 
Committee noted, abolishing the rule would not necessarily result in plac-
ing before the fact finders testimony that has not been subjected to cross-
examination.94 
If the declarant were available [to testify], compliance with the ideal 
conditions would be optional with either party.  Thus the proponent 
could call the declarant as a witness as a form of presentation more 
impressive than his hearsay statement.  Or the opponent could call the 
declarant to be cross-examined upon his statement.95 
The Advisory Committee rejected this option.96  Abolition of the hear-
say rule could also result in the admission of hearsay by declarants who are 
unavailable to testify.  Their out of court statements would be admitted 
without giving the fact finders the benefits that might accrue from cross-
examination.  The Advisory Committee thus rejected the position at each 
end of the spectrum: a rule excluding all hearsay and a rule admitting all 
hearsay.  Instead, the Committee opted for a rule favoring the use of reliable 
hearsay. 
In the Committee’s view, such a rule could take one of two forms.  The 
trial judge could be given the task of excluding unreliable hearsay whenev-
er, in the judge’s discretion, its probative value would be outweighed by the 
possibility of prejudice, waste of time, or the availability of more satisfacto-
ry evidence.97  Or the judge could be charged with excluding hearsay upon 
objection, unless the proponent convinces the judge that the hearsay falls 
within an a statutory exception that is believed to exclude unreliable hear-
say.98  The Committee rejected the first form as “involving too great a 
measure of judicial discretion, minimizing the predictability of rulings, en-
hancing the difficulties of preparation for trial, adding a further element to 
the already over-complicated congeries of pretrial procedures, and requiring 
substantially different rules for civil and criminal cases.”99 
Of all the reasons the Advisory Committee advanced, enhancing the 
difficulties of preparation for trial is the most persuasive.  Because in the 
United States the lawyers – not the trial judge – play the key role in deter-
mining how a trial unfolds, in planning their trials the lawyers need to know 
whether the judge will admit or exclude evidence.  A rule that commits the 
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admissibility of hearsay to the trial judge’s discretion ignores this reality 
and cannot work in the American style adversarial system. 
If asked, most American first year law students will respond that the 
judge is the most important person in a trial.  The judge, after all, is dressed 
differently from all others – whether lawyers, parties, jurors, or spectators –
attending the trial.  Judges are the only ones dressed in a black robe.  More-
over, they sit at a special place (the bench) which is usually elevated.  
Whenever a judge enters the court room, an armed guard (the bailiff) orders 
all others to stand.  No one can sit until after the judge sits.  No one can 
speak until after the judge formally opens the proceedings, usually by an-
nouncing the case to be heard that day. 
The reality is otherwise, however.  In American jury trials, it is the 
lawyers who are the most important persons.  In criminal trials, for exam-
ple, it is the prosecutor and defense counsel who are responsible for the 
manner in which the trial unfolds.  It is the lawyers who decide which wit-
nesses to call and the order in which they will testify.  It is the lawyers who 
decide whether non-testimonial evidence will be offered and when it will be 
offered.  It is the lawyers who decide what the witnesses will say, since 
witnesses are expected to respond only to the questions put to them.  It is 
the lawyers who formulate these questions and who put them to the wit-
nesses.  Even though the presiding judge is free to ask questions of wit-
nesses, most judges leave this task almost exclusively to the lawyers.100  
Other than ministerial duties such as opening trials and informing the 
jurors of the law that applies to the case, an American judge’s principal role 
in a jury trial is to rule on objections to the introduction of evidence offered 
by a party.  But even this role is circumscribed.  The rules of evidence oper-
ate in an adversarial environment.  As in the case of procedural rules, 
whether a particular rule of evidence will be applied will depend initially on 
whether its application is invoked by a party.  If a party fails to object to 
evidence offered by the opponent, as a rule the party loses the right to com-
plain on appeal about the introduction of inadmissible evidence.  The Cali-
fornia Evidence Code is illustrative.  It provides that a “verdict or finding 
shall not be set aside, nor shall the judgment or decision based thereon be 
reversed, by reason of the erroneous admission of evidence unless: (a) 
There appears of record an objection to or motion to exclude or strike the 
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evidence that was timely made and so stated as to make clear the specific 
ground of objection or motion. . . .”101 
In the end, the Advisory Committee opted to retain the common law 
approach to hearsay: a general rule of exclusion with exceptions.102  In com-
ing up with the exceptions enumerated in the Federal Rules, the Advisory 
Committee introduced two innovations.  First, as has been noted, it classi-
fied the exceptions by whether or not the proponent has to establish the 
hearsay declarant’s unavailability to testify at the trial.  Five exceptions 
impose this obligation on the proponent.103  The remaining thirty-one do 
not.104  Second, the Committee empowered the trial judge to create an ex-
ception in the case being tried if the hearsay offered does not fall within the 
enumerated exceptions but has comparable circumstantial guarantees of 
trustworthiness.105  As the Committee explained, the exceptions listed in the 
Federal Rules “are designed to take full advantage of the accumulated wis-
dom and experience of the past in dealing with hearsay.  It would, however, 
be presumptuous to assume that all possible desirable exceptions to the 
hearsay rule have catalogued and to pass the hearsay rule to oncoming gen-
erations as a closed system.”106  
Not passing “a closed system” to future generations of lawyers and 
judges may be commendable.  But to jurisdictions contemplating whether 
to enact a hearsay rule, the wisdom of adopting the common law approach 
is contestable.  Enacting a general rule of exclusion necessarily invites the 
question of exceptions.  The approach taken by the Advisory Committee is 
revealing.  In identifying the exceptions that should be included in the Fed-
eral Rules, the Committee did not undertake research that draws on the so-
cial sciences.  The Committee did not ask, for example, whether empirical 
research justifies the legal assumption that most exceptions allow the use of 
only reliable evidence.  Recall the hearsay exception for declarations 
against interest.  Intuitively, it may be true that most people do not say 
things that are against their interest unless they believe the things they are 
saying are true.  But in the absence of solid social science research, we 
simply do not know as a scientific matter whether this proposition is accu-
rate.  Consider also the exception for excited utterances.  Their reliability is 
said to derive from the spontaneity (and consequent lack of reflection) in-
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duced by the stress associated with the startling event giving rise to the dec-
laration.107  Some social science studies, however, suggest that stress can 
distort perception.108  Jurisdictions contemplating a shift from the inquisi-
torial to the adversarial system of litigation should pause before adopting 
wholesale the common law approach to hearsay and its exceptions.  
VII. BENCH TRIALS AND THE RULES OF EVIDENCE 
  
The American rules of evidence do not distinguish between cases tried 
to a jury and cases tried to a judge.  They apply to both types of cases.  
Whether a party is entitled to a trial by jury depends both on state law and 
federal law.  As a matter of federal constitutional law, criminal defendants 
are entitled to a jury trial whenever they are charged with committing an 
offense that is punishable by more than six months in jail.109  In some juris-
dictions, however, as a matter of state law, criminal defendants are entitled 
to a trial by jury whenever the offense is punishable by any term in jail.110  
Even in these jurisdictions, however, a criminal defendant may waive his or 
her right to trial by jury and have the judge sit as both judge and jury.  In 
the United States, cases tried to a judge are called “bench” trials because the 
elevated desk at which the judge sits is called a bench. 
When hearsay is offered at a jury trial, the judge has discretion to order 
a hearing outside the presence of the jury to determine the admissibility of 
the hearsay.  If the judge sustains the opponent’s hearsay objection, the jury 
will never learn about the hearsay, and it cannot contaminate the jury’s de-
liberations.  But if the case is tried to the judge, the judge will learn about 
the hearsay in ruling on its admissibility.  Even if the opponent succeeds in 
convincing the judge to sustain his or her objection, the opponent must wor-
ry about whether the judge will be able to disregard the hearsay in reaching 
the verdict.  An advantage, then, of an American jury trial is that it increases 
the likelihood that the fact finder will not be contaminated by inadmissible 
evidence.  That prophylactic benefit cannot be attained in Mexico, unless 
the legislation implementing the constitutional amendment calls for a panel 
of professionally trained jurors who play no role in presiding over the tri-
al.111  
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In the United States, our appellate rules are more protective of judges 
than jurors when judges preside over bench trials and they erroneously ad-
mit inadmissible evidence.  In reviewing rulings erroneously admitting evi-
dence in jury trials, appellate judges will reverse the verdict and order a 
new trial if they conclude that in the absence of the error the jury might 
have reached a different verdict.112  But when appellate judges review rul-
ings erroneously admitting evidence in bench trials, they will assume that 
their trial brethren were capable of ignoring inadmissible evidence.113  Con-
sequently, it is much more difficult to convince an appellate court to reverse 
a verdict reached by a judge than one rendered by a jury.  Yet, there is noth-
ing in the training and work of American judges that confers upon them a 
special immunity to the deleterious effects of inadmissible evidence, includ-
ing hearsay. 
Why are the American appellate courts more solicitous of trial judges 
when they sit as a jury of one?  Because of the belief held by some legal 
scholars that the common law developed the exclusionary rules of evidence 
principally to protect jurors from unreliable evidence.  Professor James 
Bradley Thayer, one of the most prominent American evidence scholars of 
the Nineteenth Century, maintains that the development of rules of evidence 
has been the “product of the jury system . . . where ordinary untrained citi-
zens are acting as the judges of fact.”114  In particular, he views the hearsay 
rule as “the child of the jury [system],”115  If Thayer is right, the hearsay 
rule might not have developed if jurors had never been employed to resolve 
factual controversies in Anglo-American trials.116  Had that been the case, 
hearsay might be freely admissible with judges reserving the right to assign 
whatever weight they thought the hearsay deserved.  Parties would call 
hearsay declarants only if they thought that their testimony would be more 
impressive than their out-of-court statements.  If a party failed to do so, the 
opponent would be free to call the hearsay declarant if he believed that he 
could discredit the declarant’s account on cross-examination.  The hearsay 
rule might not have developed or might have been frozen in its early stages, 
when hearsay was admissible only to corroborate other evidence and could 
not by itself support a judicial finding.117 
If Thayer is right, the implications for civil law jurisdictions contem-
plating moving from an inquisitorial to an adversarial system of litigation 
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are worth pondering if judges trained in the law, not ordinary citizens, are to 
serve as the jurors.  These jurisdictions might be better served by rules that 
(1) prohibit the use of hearsay, unless the proponent first convinces the 
judge of its inability to produce the hearsay declarant under the procedures 
provided by the forum; (2) allow the opponent to call and cross-examine the 
hearsay declarant (if available to testify) when the proponent fails to do so; 
(3) permit the opponent to impeach the hearsay declarant by any means that 
would be available if the declarant had testified at the hearing;  and (4) 
excuse the proponent from having to establish the hearsay declarant’s un-
availability to testify whenever the proponent convinces the judge that the 
opponent engaged in wrongdoing that was intended to and did procure the 
declarant’s unavailability.  
Such an approach would confer other benefits.  It would allow these 
jurisdictions to avoid complex questions that have haunted the common law 
regarding the definition of hearsay and the adequacy of the justifications of 
exceptions.  The Federal Rules of Evidence defining hearsay and its excep-
tions and the comments of the Advisory Committee comprise 68 pages.118  
The comparable California Evidence Code sections and comments take up 
44 pages.119  The chapters in my treatise explaining hearsay and its excep-
tions take up 243 pages, even though I designed my book as a concise one-
volume treatise.120  Multi-volume treatises on evidence abound in the Unit-
ed States.121  Although in the United States extended discussion is necessary 
given the current intricacies of American evidence law, other jurisdictions 
should seek to avoid needless complexity when considering switching to an 
adversarial model of litigation. 
   
VIII.  THE RIGHT TO CONFRONT WITNESSES V. THE RIGHT TO TRIAL BY 
JURY 
In the United States, an important distinction is drawn between the 
right to cross-examine adverse witnesses and the right to trial by jury.  As 
noted, American parties have the right to cross-examine adverse witnesses, 
irrespective of whether the case being tried is criminal or civil.  As has also 
been explained, the hearsay rule gives teeth to the cross-examination right 
by generally forcing the proponent to call the hearsay declarant as a wit-
ness, unless an exception applies or, as in criminal cases, the accused has 
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forfeited his Sixth Amendment right to confront the declarant.122  As a statu-
tory matter, the right to cross-examine adverse witnesses is independent of 
whether the parties trying the case are entitled to trial by jury.123  
In the United States, the right to trial by jury in criminal cases is not 
considered “a mere procedural formality” but “a fundamental reservation of 
power” in the American constitutional structure.124  “Just as suffrage ensures 
the people’s ultimate control in the legislative and executive branches, jury 
trial is meant to ensure their control in the judiciary.”125  Accordingly, in the 
United States appellate courts have developed rules to insulate jury verdicts 
from judicial interference.  First, where the jury renders a not guilty verdict, 
principles relating to double jeopardy generally forbid the state from ap-
pealing the verdict to the appellate courts.  A not guilty verdict rendered by 
the accused’s peers is final because it is generally unreviewable and hence 
irreversible.126  Second, where the appealing party claims that the evidence 
is insufficient to support the jury verdict, the appellate judges may not re-
verse the judgment and order a new trial unless the appealing party per-
suades them that the evidence admitted is inadequate to support the verdict 
under a sufficiency standard.127  In a criminal case, this means that the ap-
pellate judges may not reverse a guilty verdict on grounds of the insuffi-
ciency of the evidence, unless they find that no reasonable juror could have 
found the defendant guilty even if the prosecution’s evidence was be-
lieved.128  In determining whether the evidence admitted at the trial supports 
the conviction, the appellate judges are required to “view the record in a 
light most favorable to conviction, resolving all conflicts in the evidence 
and drawing all reasonable inferences in support of conviction.”129 
The latter American appellate rule contrasts sharply with the appellate 
rules of some civil law jurisdictions.  In some countries, the right of appeal 
includes a reconsideration of factual as well as legal questions and may 
even include the right to introduce new evidence at the appellate level.130  
The adversarial trial contemplated by Article 20 of the Mexican Constitu-
tion includes the right of the accused and the prosecution to try the case 
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before an impartial tribunal whose members have not participated in pretrial 
investigations or pretrial hearings.131  Article 20 also includes the right of 
the parties to have the fact finder determine the verdict on the basis of the 
evidence admitted at the trial.132  Combined, these two provisions establish 
the right to have the case decided by an impartial fact finder.  If the imple-
menting legislation enacted by the states and the federal Congress calls for 
a panel of judges to serve as the jurors, then legislators will have to consid-
er the finality that should be accorded to their not guilty verdicts as well as 
the need for appellate review rules that respect guilty verdicts when crimi-
nal defendants challenge them on insufficiency grounds. 
IX.  PANELS V. SINGLE JUDGES 
The new Mexican constitutional amendment does not require criminal 
cases to be tried to a jury.  Nor does it require the case to be tried to a single 
judge.  It simply requires the case to be tried before an impartial judge and 
an impartial fact finder.133  One state, Chihuahua, that switched from the 
inquisitorial to the adversarial model shortly before the adoption of the new 
amendment, does provide for an impartial jury made up of a panel of three 
judges.134  If the Mexican reform takes the form of a presiding judge and a 
separate panel of judges to serve as the jurors, an important question will be 
the optimal size of the panel.  This question arose in the United States in 
Ballew v. Georgia, where a defendant who was convicted by a state jury 
consisting of only five jurors appealed his conviction to the United States 
Supreme Court.135  The Court reversed the conviction, holding that under 
the Federal Constitution, the accused was entitled to be tried by a state jury 
consisting of no less than six persons.136  
In an earlier case, Williams v. Florida,137 the Court ruled that the Fed-
eral Constitution does not require states to provide juries consisting of 
twelve persons, the number traditionally associated with common law ju-
ries.138  In Williams the Court sustained a guilty verdict returned by a jury of 
                                                                                                                           
 
131
 Constituciòn Polìtica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [Const.], as amended, art. 20, at ¶ IV, 
Diario Oficial de la Federaciòn [D.O.], 5 de Febrero de 1917 (Mex.).   
 
132
 Id. at art. 20, ¶ III.   
 
133
 Constituciòn Polìtica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [Const.], as amended, art. 20, at ¶ III-
IV, Diario Oficial de la Federaciòn [D.O.], 5 de Febrero de 1917 (Mex.). 
 
134
 See Código de Procedimientos Penales del Estado de Chihuahua [C.P.P.C.] [Chihuahua Crimi-
nal Procedure Code], as amended, ch. I, at art. 5, Periódico Oficial del Estado de Chihuahua [P.O.], 8 de 
Agusto de 2009 (Mex.). 
 
135
 435 U.S. 223, 228 (1978).  
 
136
 Id. at 239.  
 
137
 399 U.S. 78, 86 (1970).  
 
138
 Id. at 103.  
2009] Is a Hearsay Rule Indispensable? 37 
 
six persons.139  The question posed by Ballew was whether the Federal Con-
stitution barred states from using juries of less than six persons.  In ruling in 
the defendant’s favor, the Court was moved by a number of studies of jury 
behavior.140  Most were published between the Williams (1970) and the Bal-
lew (1978) decisions.141 
First, these studies suggest “that progressively smaller juries are less 
likely to foster effective group deliberation.  At some point, this decline 
leads to inaccurate fact-finding and incorrect application of the common 
sense of the community to the facts.”142 
Second, the studies “raise doubts about the accuracy of the results 
achieved by smaller and smaller panels.  Statistical studies suggest that the 
risk of convicting an innocent person (Type I error) rises as the size of the 
jury diminishes.”143 
Third, the studies indicate that progressively smaller juries are more 
likely than progressively larger juries to reach inconsistent verdicts on the 
same evidence.144  The inconsistency was demonstrated by having mock 
juries of different sizes listen to and view the same evidence.145  The greater 
the risk that juries of a given size will reach inconsistent verdicts, the great-
er the risk they will reach incorrect verdicts.  
Fourth, the studies suggest that progressively smaller juries are less 
likely to include diverse points of view, especially those offered by mem-
bers of minority groups.146  Because the United States is a multicultural 
society, the legitimacy of jury verdicts requires that care be taken not to 
exclude potential jurors on account of their race or ethnicity.  
In deciding that a jury of five failed to comport with the constitutional 
minimum, the Court acknowledged the difficulty of specifying the mini-
mum number. 
We readily admit that we do not pretend to discern a clear line be-
tween six members and five.  But the assembled data raise substantial 
doubt about the reliability and appropriate representation of panels 
smaller than six.  Because of the fundamental importance of the jury 
trial to the American system of criminal justice, any further reduction 
that promotes inaccurate and possibly biased decisionmaking, that 
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causes untoward differences in verdicts, and that prevents juries from 
truly representing their communities, attains constitutional signific-
ance.
147
 
A year later, the same reliability and representational concerns moved the 
Court to hold that if a state jury consists only of six persons, then its verdict 
must be unanimous.148  
Civil law jurisdictions considering switching to the adversarial model 
of trials should ponder whether the number of jurors, whether professional 
or lay, they specify will be sufficiently large to diminish the risk of mista-
ken verdicts.   The studies cited by the Court indicate that in this country a 
panel consisting of less than six lay jurors would be unable as a rule to re-
turn reliable verdicts.149  Whether a panel made up of less than six judges 
poses a lower risk is an empirical question.  The studies cited by the Court 
also indicate that in this country voting rules matter.  The smaller the jury, 
the greater the need for unanimity if American jurors are to return reliable 
verdicts.  Civil law jurisdictions contemplating reform need to consider the 
interplay between voting rules and the size of the jury panel. 
X.  SOME CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
Even if it were constitutionally possible for American jurisdictions to 
adopt a criminal trial model in which a panel of judges would replace the 
citizen jurors, defense lawyers would still insist on the application of the 
hearsay rule.  They would resist a model abolishing the rule and allowing 
the professional jurors to determine the weight to be given to the hearsay.  
Defense lawyers would likely advance two major reasons for opposing the 
abolition of the hearsay rule.  First, no social science research has been un-
dertaken to test Thayer’s observation that judges, unlike citizen jurors, can 
accurately gauge the probative value of hearsay.  Outside the courtroom, all 
of us frequently rely on hearsay in reaching decisions.  Although American 
law school graduates do learn about the dangers of hearsay in the course of 
their legal training, they are not trained in evaluating the probative value of 
hearsay.  And even if law school graduates knew how to discount the value 
of hearsay, it is unclear whether they would apply that skill when serving as 
jurors. 
Second, experienced criminal defense lawyers know of the indispens-
able role that cross-examination can play in exposing flaws in a witness’s 
powers of perception, recollection, and narration, including sincerity.  They 
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understand that unless defense counsel are given an opportunity to confront 
the state’s witnesses, a substantial risk exists that jurors might reach a guilty 
verdict on the basis of untested evidence.  Because American criminal de-
fense lawyers value the role of cross-examination so highly, it is inconceiv-
able that they would readily agree to abolish the hearsay rule simply be-
cause a panel of judges would replace the panel of citizen jurors. 
Defense lawyers, however, are not the only ones who appreciate the 
hearsay rule and the role of cross-examination.  American prosecutors also 
value the opportunity to discredit defense witnesses on cross-examination.  
In the United States, the hearsay rule applies in both civil and criminal trials 
and can be invoked by all parties; it is not limited to criminal defendants.  
To American trial lawyers and judges, the reason is obvious: the rule seeks 
to promote reliable verdicts by withdrawing from the jury’s consideration 
evidence that has not been tested through cross-examination. 
Such an important function militates in favor of enacting a hearsay 
rule in jurisdictions considering changing from an inquisitorial to an adver-
sarial model of litigation.  The challenge for these jurisdictions will be to 
find a way to do so without inadvertently incorporating all of the complexi-
ties that attend the American hearsay rule and its exceptions. 
 
